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THE TENSION BETWEEN LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Brian Z. Tamanaha* 
At the heart of the United States legal culture lie two core notions 
that exist in deep tension with one another: the idea that law is an 
instrument, and the rule of law ideal. Although they continue to coexist 
despite this tension, there are indications that the instrumental view of 
law is putting a serious strain on the rule of law ideal. In addition to the 
fact that both notions are equally fundamental in our legal culture, what 
makes this situation especially intransigent is that there is little attention 
to the debilitating effects that legal instrumentalism has on the rule of 
law. This internal tension is especially important to understand in 
connection with the prospects for establishing the rule of law around the 
world because both ideas are being promoting abroad simultaneously, 
as a package. 
It will help the argument to state up front what is meant by legal 
instrumentalism and what is meant by the rule of law. Both ideas are 
plagued by a surplus of alternative understandings and variations, so 
here they will be stated in plain and simplified terms, to be elaborated 
upon later. Broadly speaking, the instrumental view of law is the notion 
that law is an instrument to achieve ends. At the systemic level, it has 
often been said that law is an instrument to serve the public good, or an 
instrument to direct social change; it has also often been said that law is 
an instrument of domination by one group over another within society. 
In this understanding the law is an empty vessel that can be filled in any 
way desired, at the will of the lawmaker, to achieve any end desired. At 
the level of legal practice, it has been said that lawyers instrumentally 
manipulate or utilize legal rules and processes to achieve the ends of 
their clients; in relation to judging it has been said that judges 
increasingly reason instrumentally to lead to particular outcomes when 
deciding cases. 
Although there are many competing formulations of the rule of law 
ideal, they can be lumped into two basic versions. 1 The substantive 
version of the rule of law is the idea that there are legal limits on the 
government: there are certain things the government cannot do, even 
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when exercising its sovereign lawmaking power. This version of the 
rule of law ensures the "rightness" of law in accordance with a 
preexisting higher standard. The formal version of the rule of law is the 
idea that the government is bound to abide by legal rules that are 
publicly set forth in advance, are certain and stable, and are applied 
equally to all in accordance with their terms. This version of the rule of 
law ensures the predictability of law, which allows citizens to plan their 
affairs with knowledge of the legal consequences of their actions. Both 
versions of the rule of law ideally share the basic proposition that the 
government and its officials, as well as citizens, operate within legal 
limits and are bound to follow legal rules. The basic difference is that 
the former version sets limits on the permissible content of law, whereas 
in the latter version the law can be whatever the law maker desires, as 
long as it satisfies the formal requirements set out above. Legal theorist 
Joseph Raz emphasized the key implication of this difference: "A non-
democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on 
extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities, and racial 
persecution, may in principle, conform to the requirements of the 
[formal] rule of law .... "2 Substantive versions of the rule of law, by 
contrast, would rule out evil laws as invalid. 
Using these general descriptions, the two types of tension between 
legal instrumentalism and the rule of law ideal can now be summarily 
stated. At the systemic level the tension arises because the idea that law 
is an instrument is, in itself, devoid of any limits on the content of law. 
The only constraints on law are social ones, relating to the efficacy of 
the law and its ability to overcome any resistance it may face in pursuit 
of the ends designated. The purely instrumental view of law, to state it 
more pointedly, directly challenges the notion that there are substantive 
limits on law. Law is there to serve ends designated by the lawmaker, 
whatever those ends might be and whatever the means required to 
achieve those ends. 
Indeed, it is important to recognize, the modem shift in liberal 
societies away from a substantive understanding of the rule of law 
toward a formal understanding of the rule of law was concomitant with 
the rise of the instrumental view-they were linked as siblings born of 
the same complex of factors. This ·association is plainly evident in 
Raz's avowedly instrumental characterization of law in a formal rule of 
law system: 
2. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 211 (1979). 
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A good knife is, among other things, a sharp knife. Similarly, 
conformity to the [formal] rule of law is an inherent value of laws, 
indeed it is their most important inherent value. . . . Like other 
instruments, the law has a specific virtue which is morally neutral in 
being neutral as to the end to which the instrument is put. 3 
133 
A purely instrumental view of law, however, in addition to 
challenging the substantive rule of law, also has a tendency to undercut 
the formal rule of law. In relation to the conduct of lawyers and judges, 
an instrumental understanding of law suggests that legal rules and 
processes are tools to be manipulated to achieve desired objectives, 
rather than as binding dictates. Lawyers stretch and twist legal rules 
that stand in their way; judges reason toward ends or goals, setting aside 
or creatively interpreting legal rules if need be. In both situations an 
instrumental view of law detracts from the essential characteristic that 
defines rules: their binding quality. Legal instrumentalism at this level 
operates against the formal rule of law requirements that the legal rules 
be certain and stable, and be applied equally to all according to their 
terms. 
Starting with a discussion of former non-instrumental views of 
law, I will support these assertions by outlining the growth and 
implications of instrumental views of law for the rule of law in the 
respects just indicated. 
I. NON-INSTRUMENTAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF LAW 
It is characteristic of non-instrumental views that the content of 
law is in some sense given; that law is immanent; that the process of 
law-making is not a matter of creation but one of discovery; that law is 
not the product of human will; that law has a kind of autonomy and 
internal integrity; that law is in some sense objectively determined. 
In the Medieval period in Europe two distinct (yet commingled) 
types of law possessed these characteristics. The first type was natural 
law and divine law in the Catholic tradition-the Ten Commandments, 
for example. Divine and natural Law were thought to be binding upon 
and infused the positive law that governed society. They were pre-
given by God and were the product of God's will, unalterable by man. 
They were objective in that they constituted absolute moral and legal 
truths that were binding on all. They set limits on the positive law. The 
content of these laws and principles were discerned through revelation 
3. Id. at 225-26 (emphasis added). 
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(including scripture) and through the application of reason implanted in 
man by God. As medieval scholar Walter Ullmann put it, "the law itself 
as the external regulator of society was based upon faith. Faith and law 
stood to each other in the relation of cause and effect. ,,4 
The second type was customary law. Everyday life during the 
Medieval period was governed by customary law, or, more accurately, 
by overlapping and sometimes conflicting regimes of customary law: 
feudal law, the law of the manor, Germanic customary law, residues of 
Roman law, trade customs, and local customs. Customary law was said 
to have existed from time immemorial. It was derived from and 
constituted the very way of life of the community, the byways and 
folkways of the people. Law was "'the law of one's fathers', the 
preexisting, objective, legal situation .... "5 As such, the content of 
customary law was not the product of any particular individual or any 
group's will, but was a collective emanation from below. Accordingly, 
the process of explicitly articulating and applying the law was a matter 
of discovering and declaring the unwritten law that was already 
manifested or immanent in the community life. 
These intertwined understandings of law, which dominated for at 
least a millennium, were non-instrumental in the core respect that they 
represented a pre-given order that encompassed everyone, including 
state officials and the sovereign. It was a law for all that was the 
product of no one. The law was not subject to the will of anyone and 
not in the specific interest of anyone. It was the law of the community. 
Certain groups were in more favorable positions than others, to be sure, 
as nobles were to serfs, but everyone had a place within an organic 
society governed by law. Legislation in the modem sense of the 
enactment of positive legal norms did exist, but it was sparse and 
generally understood to involve making explicit the already existing 
immanent law. Emperors, kings and princes had the power to declare 
law, but this power was bounded by the natural, divine, and customary 
law. Acts of express law-making always took place within a framework 
of already existing, non-will based law. 
Historical understandings of the common law in the United States 
provide two distinct examples of non-instrumental law. The first one, 
which held sway through the second half of the nineteenth century, is 
continuous with the above two Medieval understandings of law; the 
second one, which grew in the course of the nineteenth century and 
4. WALTER ULLMAN, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE MIDDLE AGES 101 
(1965). 
5. FRITZKERN,KlNGSHIPANDLAWINTHEMIDDLEAGES 70-71 (1956). 
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dominated for a short time into the twentieth century, characterized law 
as a science. 
The common law in the U.S. was heavily influenced by English 
common law, although it came to follow a separate path. Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England had an inestimable impact, 
providing the basic training material for apprentices who wished to 
become lawyers in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well 
the leading text in early law schools.6 The U.S. legal tradition was also 
influenced by a strong belief in the natural rights of life, liberty, and 
property, as indicated in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of 
Rights. 
Traditional English understandings of the common law, carried 
over to the U.S., pointed to two underpinnings.7 First, as with the 
Medieval views described above, the common law was thought to be a 
product of the customs of the people from time immemorial, an "ancient 
collection of unwritten maxims and customs," Blackstone wrote.8 It 
was said that the law represented the lived ways of the community, their 
collective wisdom recognized and refined into law-"the expression or 
manifestation of commonly shared values and conceptions of 
reasonableness and the common good."9 This origin in the customs and 
usages of the people was thought to render the law consensual in nature. 
"This consent is deeper than agreeing to have other persons represent 
one in a legislative assembly. It comes from a recognition that the rules 
that governs one's life are one's own, they define that life, give it 
structure and meaning, are already practiced and so deeply engrained 
that they appear to one as purely natural."10 At the same time, the 
common law was also the very embodiment of reason, natural rights 
and principle. This was so because universal custom and usage was 
thought to reflect and be evidence of natural principle, and also because 
judges refined the common law and its principles through reasoned 
analysis. When engaging in this activity judges were declaring law, not 
creating law. 
6. See Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A 
Study of Intellectuallmpact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731 (1976). 
7. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF LAW: AN ESSAY ON 
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (2d ed. 1996) (discussing Blackstone's Commentaries with 
superb incite). 
8. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 17 (photo. 
reprint 1979) (1767), quoted in GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION 4 (1986). 
9. POSTEMA, supra note 8, at 6-7. 
10. Id. at 16-17. 
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Jesse Root, a leading U.S. lawyer, articulated in 1798 this 
characteristic understanding: 
[Our] common law was derived from the law of nature and of 
revelation; those rules and maxims of immutable truth and justice, 
which arise from the eternal fitness of things, which need only to be 
understood, to be submitted to; as they are themselves the highest 
authority; together with certain customs and usages, which had been 
universally assented to and adopted in practice, as reasonable and 
beneficial. 11 
According to Root, the common law: "is the perfection of reason"; 
"universal"; "embraces all cases and questions that can possibly arise"; 
"is in itself perfect, clear and certain"; "is superior to all other laws and 
regulations"; "all positive laws are to be construed by it, and wherein 
they are opposed to it they are void"; "it is immemorial."12 There is a 
remarkable continuity to these views of the common law within the 
Anglo-American legal tradition that extends back centuries. 13 
By the early nineteenth century, these longstanding ideas about law 
had begun to lose their power, owing in part to Enlightenment ideas and 
owing in part to new social and economic realities that rendered the old 
common law rules obsolete. Borrowing from the newfound prestige of 
the natural sciences, science was the ascendant form of legitimation for 
law. Blackstone, whose Commentaries were based on a series of 
lectures he delivered at Oxford commencing in 1753, claimed that "law 
is to be considered not only as a matter of practice, but also as a rational 
science";14 as such, it was "an object of academical knowledge" that 
ought to be studied in the University. 15 The extraordinary success of the 
Commentaries owed in large part to its organized categorization and 
systematic presentation of the common law, a feat not previously 
accomplished. 
As the prestige of science grew, so did the identification of the 
common law as a science. Richard Rush, a leading U.S. lawyer, 
11. JESSE ROOT, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT AND LAWS IN CONNECTICUT, 
Preface to Volume /, iv (1798), excerpted in MARK DEWOLFE, READINGS IN AMERICAN 
LEGAL HISTORY 17, 16-24 (1949). 
12. DE WOLFE, supra note 11, at 19. 
13. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF 
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 32-33 ( 1957). 
14. BOORSTIN, supra note 7, at 20. 
15. DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 32 (1989). 
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published an essay in 1815 on "American Jurisprudence," which 
declared: "The law itself in this country, is, moreover, a science of great 
extent. We have an entire substratum of common law as the broad 
foundation upon which every thing else is built."16 An unattributed 
1851 essay in a major law journal described the sense in which law is a 
science: 
Like other sciences, [law] is supposed to be pervaded by general rules, 
shaping its structure, solving its intricacies, explaining its apparent 
contradictions. Like other sciences, it is supposed to have first or 
fundamental principles, never modified, and the immovable basis on 
which the whole structure reposes; and also a series of dependent 
principles and rules, modified and subordinated by reason and 
circumstances, extending outward in unbroken connection to the 
remotest applications oflaw. 17 
Among the legal elite this was a standard understanding. Nationally 
renowned law reformer, David Dudley Field, in 1859 effused that there 
is no science "greater in magnitude or importance" than "the science of 
law."18 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, appointed in 1870 to be the first 
Dean of the Harvard Law School, offered an often cited articulation: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or 
doctrines .... Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by 
slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases 
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a 
series of cases. . . . It seems to me, therefore, to be possible to take 
such a branch of the law as Contracts, for example, and, without 
exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify, and 
arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree to 
the growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential 
doctrines .... " 19 
16. RICHARD RUSH, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1815), reprinted in READINGS IN 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 268, 271 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed. 1949). 
17. Nature and Method of Legal Studies, 3 u .s. MONTHLY L. MAG. 381-82 ( 1851) 
18. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, MAGNITUDE AND IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1859), 
reprinted in STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LA w AND JURISPRUDENCE IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 740, 740-745 (5th ed. 2000). 
19. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Preface to Selection of Cases on the Law of 
Contracts, reprinted in PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 18, at 747. A similar 
characterization of law as a science was written by the Dean of Columbia Law School; see 
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Law, according to this account, was a science with inductive, 
analytical and deductive aspects. Decided cases were the raw material 
of law (its empirical component). Decisions fell into patterns, from 
which the governing rules, concepts and principles could be derived 
through induction. These rules, concepts and principles could be 
logically organized and their necessary content and implications made 
evident, then applied deductively to determine the outcomes in future 
cases. Lawyers, judges, and law professors engaged in this process in 
an ongoing basis. The common law and rights together formed a 
coherent and gapless whole which objectively determined the decision 
in any given case. These ideas formed the basis of a school of thought 
known as formalists, to be discussed later.20 
Non-instrumental views of law as a science survived well the 
twentieth century. Yale law professor Walter Wheeler Cook observed 
in the American Bar Association Journal in 1927: 
Prominent teachers of law still tell us that we must preserve what they 
call the logical symmetry of the law, that after all the law is logical; 
and talk about deducting the rule to be applied to a new situation by 
logic from some 'fundamental principle." Back of all this, it is 
submitted, is nothing but the old logic; the assumption that in some 
way or other we can discover general 'laws,' 'general principles,' 
Aristotelian 'universals,' which by means of logical, that is, syllogistic 
reasoning, we can deal with new cases as they arise as merely new 
samples of preexisting classes. The nineteenth century notion of 
science as the ascertainment of all-embracing laws of nature, holding 
for all occasions [is still prevalent]. 
It would be safe to assert that essentially the same ideas underlie 
nearly all the teaching in our law schools.21 
II. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN NON-INSTRUMENTAL VIEWS OF THE 
COMMON LAW AND THE SUBSTANTIVE RULE OF LAW IDEAL 
As indicated at the outset of this article, a core meaning of the rule 
of law ideal is that substantive legal limits are placed on the 
government. 22 The rule of law in this sense entails the existence of legal 
William A. Keener, Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE L.J. 143 (1892). 
20. A superb study of Langdell's ideas is Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
21. Walter Wheeler Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 306 
(1927). 
22. See TAMANAHA, supra note 1. 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 33, No. 1 [2005], Art. 11
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/11
2005] Legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law 139 
limits on the sovereign. J.G.A. Pocock explained how this shaped early 
seventeenth century views of the common law: 
But the attraction which the concept of the ancient constitution 
possessed for lawyers and parliamentarians probably resided less in 
whatever ultimate principle provided its base, than in its value as a 
purely negative argument. For a truly immemorial constitution could 
not be subject to a sovereign: since a king could not be known to have 
founded it originally, the king now reigning could not claim to revoke 
rights rooted in some ancestor's will. In an age when people's minds 
were becoming deeply, if dimly, imbued with the fear of some sort of 
sovereignty or absolutism, it must have satisfied many men's minds to 
be able to argue that the laws of the land were so ancient as to be the 
product of no one's will, and to appeal to the almost universally 
respected doctrine that law should be above will .... [W]e see how the 
concept of antiquity satisfied the need ... for a rule of law which, like 
Magna Carta, would have no sovereign. 23 
Medieval versions of non-instrumental law, continued by early 
understandings of the English common law, set, or attempted to set, 
legal constraints on the power of kings and parliaments to declare 
whatever they willed as the law. Although in the United States the 
surrounding trappings (the Constitution) and the mechanism Gudicial 
review) by which it operated were different, non-instrumental views of 
the common law throughout the nineteenth century similarly were 
utilized to set constraints on the power to make law. It was no accident 
that non-instrumental accounts of the common law typically evinced 
hostility toward legislation. Even when legislation was not subjected to 
judicial review by judges, it was strictly construed or given niggardly 
interpretations by judges to insure that it conformed to the common law 
and constitutional principles. It was in this sense that society was 
thought to truly be governed by the rule of law and not the unfettered 
will of law makers. 
Ill. THE ENLIGHTENMENT'S IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-INSTRUMENTAL 
LAW 
The eighteenth century Enlightenment was characterized by the 
rise in the prestige of science and reason as the most reliable sources of 
truth and knowledge. After the miraculous discoveries of Newton, who 
23. POCOCK, supra note 13, at 51-52. 
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announced a handful of natural laws that governed everything in the 
heavens and on earth, it was thought that all of the secrets of the natural 
order would be revealed by science. It was also thought by the 
Enlightenment Philosophes that, just as the natural order could be 
discovered and beneficially exploited, so too could the social order be 
mastered. A science of man and society-focusing on human nature-
would yield knowledge about the natural principles of law and morality, 
enabling mankind to use reason to shape society to achieve material and 
political progress. Science and reason were applied to critically 
examine myths, superstitions, religious dogma, longstanding traditions 
and customs. 
The critical thrust of Enlightenment views effectively undermined 
the two aforementioned Medieval pillars of non-instrumental views of 
law-natural and divine law, and longstanding custom. Many 
Enlightenment thinkers were hostile to Catholicism, specifically, and 
institutionalized religion generally. Divine revelation and Catholic 
natural law thus became less acceptable as sources of law. Similarly, 
the Enlightenment emphasis on critical scrutiny of received tradition 
undermined the prestige that had always attached to custom. What was 
once seen as the wisdom of the ages came to be seen as blind fetters of 
the dead past holding back progress. A new emphasis on historical 
studies, another product of the Enlightenment, produced demonstrations 
that historical times and longstanding custom and usage were, often as 
not, tyrannical and barbarous, not worthy of emulation or continuing 
deference.24 
Many contemporaries of the period, including Blackstone, 
simultaneously held onto pre-Enlightenment views and Enlightenment 
views, notwithstanding their conflict. Historian Bernard Bailyn found 
this in the ideas that surrounded the American Revolution: 
The common lawyers the colonists cited, for example, sought to 
establish right by appeal to precedent and to an unbroken tradition 
evolving from time immemorial, and they assumed, if they did not 
argue, that the accumulation of the ages, the burden of inherited 
custom, contained within it a greater wisdom than any man or group 
of men could devise by the power of reason. Nothing could have been 
more alien to the Enlightenment rationalists whom the colonists also 
quoted-and with equal enthusiasm. These theorists felt that it was 
24. See, for example, JOHN MILTON GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE 
PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (Amo Press 1972) (1819). 
Originally published in 1819, this book has a remarkably modem critical sensibility. 
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precisely the heavy crust of custom that was weighing down the spirit 
of man; they sought to throw it off and to create by unfettered power 
of reason a framework of institutions superior to the accidental 
inheritance of the past.25 
141 
Ultimately, however, the implications of Enlightenment arguments 
proved fatal to the foundations of law and morality. The Philosophes 
were not moral relativists or anarchists. To the contrary, their goals 
were to establish sounder, more rational, and scientific footings for law 
and morality, to bring about a more just society. At the outset they had 
no doubts that they would be successful in the search for rational moral 
and legal principles. 
Today we know that they failed. The reasons for this are many, 
only two of which will be recited here. First, exploration of the world 
made it increasingly evident that there were a multitude of diverse 
moral systems with apparently little in common, suggesting that 
morality and law were largely conventional. Human nature was base 
and could at most be used to come up with a minimum set of rules 
necessary to survive in society. Second, the power and scope of reason 
became restricted. Reason was once thought capable of producing 
substantive principles of the right and good. But in the course of the 
Enlightenment reason came to be seen as instrumental. Reason enabled 
people to efficiently achieve their ends, but it could not identify the 
proper ends to be desired. Notions about the good and right appeared at 
bottom to be a product of surrounding cultural views and individual 
tastes or passions. 
An enduring, bedeviling legacy of the Enlightenment is that it 
undercut former beliefs in divine and natural law, and faith in the 
wisdom of custom and tradition, once thought to provide correct 
principles for morality, law, and life, but it offered no persuasive 
replacements. Thus, it spelled the demise of non-instrumental views of 
law, for it undermined the very idea that law had or could have any kind 
of immanent substantive content or integrity. Law thereafter could only 
be a matter of expediency rather than inherent necessity. 
IV. THE SPREAD OF INSTRUMENTAL VIEWS OF LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Roscoe Pound provided the most 
25. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 
ENLARGED EDITION 33-34 (enlarged ed., 1992). 
11
Tamanaha: The Tension Between Legal Instrumentalism And The Rule of Law
Published by SURFACE, 2005
142 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 33:131 
systematic early arguments in support of an instrumental understanding 
of law. Holmes called Langdell the "greatest living legal theologian."26 
Holmes objected to Langdell' s portrayal of law as a logically 
constructed self-contained system of rules and principles that could be 
deductively applied to produce answers in specific cases. He asserted 
that "you can give any conclusion a logical form. "27 He was not against 
legal principles and logical consistency as such, only against portraying 
this systematic coherence as the ultimate end of law, and he was 
skeptical of the claim that judges reasoned objectively in this manner. 
Holmes dismissed another often cited pillar of the common law: "The 
time has gone by when law is only an unconscious embodiment of the 
common will." 28 
Holmes urged in instrumental terms that "a body of law is more 
rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred 
articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the 
grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be stated in 
words."29 "The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of 
logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty 
and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is 
an illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man."3° Competing social 
interests must be weighed and choices based upon social policy must be 
made. Holmes urged that judges engage in this process openly rather 
than subconsciously or covertly. "[T]he result of the often proclaimed 
judicial aversion to deal with such [policy] considerations is simply to 
leave the very ground and foundation of the judgments inarticulate. 
,,31 
Pound likewise attacked the characterization of law as an abstract, 
logical science. "Law is not scientific for the sake of science. "32 He 
accused adherents of this approach, what he called a "jurisprudence of 
conceptions,"33 for emphasizing logical deduction from assumed 
dogmas of law with little attention to social consequences: 
26. Oliver W. Holmes, Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing the 
second edition of Langdell's contract law casebook). 
27. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897). 
28. Quoted in WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 
180 (1998). 
29. Holmes, supra note 27, at 469. 
30. Id. at 465-66. 
31. Id. at 467. 
32. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908). 
33. Id. at 611. 
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... the jurisprudence of conceptions tends to decay. Conceptions are 
fixed. The premises are no longer to be examined. Everything is 
reduced to simple deduction from them. Principles cease to have 
importance. The law becomes a body of rules. This is the condition 
against which sociologists now protest, and protest rightly.34 
That our case law at its maturity has acquired the sterility of a fully 
developed system, may be shown by abundant examples of its failure 
to respond to vital needs of present-day life.35 
143 
To serve as the epitome of flawed formalist reasoning, Pound 
offered Lochner v. New York, an infamous case in the annals of 
American jurisprudence.36 To protect workers' health and safety, the 
New York legislature imposed limits on the working hours of bakers to 
no more than ten hours a day and sixty hours a week. The Court 
invalidated the statute as an: "unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary 
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to 
enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him 
appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family."37 
Basing the decision on the abstract liberty of contract, the Court ignored 
the reality that the bakers had no freedom to bargain-they took the 
conditions of emEloyment imposed upon them by the employers, or 
didn't get the job. 8 Justice Holmes issued a still echoing dissent, which 
lacerated the majority for reading their own personal laissez faire views 
into the Constitution. 39 
In the same vein as Holmes, Pound wrote that "as a means to an 
end, [law] must be judged by the results it achieves, not by the niceties 
of its internal structure. . . . ,'4o "We do not base institutions upon 
deduction from assumed principles of human nature; we require them to 
exhibit practical utility, and we rest them 1;/?on a foundation of policy 
and established adaptation to human needs.' 1 
Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and Felix Cohen, and other Legal 
34. Id. at 612. 
35. Id. at 614. 
36. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908). 
37. Id. at 56. 
38. Id. at 57. 
39. Id. at 75. 
40. Pound, supra note 32, at 605; see also Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological 
Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 ( 1907). 
41. Pound, supra note 32, at 609. 
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Realists, assumed a more radical stance than Pound, but on the need for 
an instrumental view of law they were in complete agreement. In 
Llewellyn's characterization, the Legal Realists "view rules, they view 
law, as means to end."42 This was the "major tenet" of Legal Realism.43 
Prevailing formalist views of the law involved two distinct notions: 
conceptual formalism and rule formalism. Conceptual formalism was 
the idea that legal concepts and principles, like liberty of contract, 
consisted of necessary content and logical interrelations, all of which 
could be discerned through reason. Conceptual formalism was a version 
of non-instrumental views of law described earlier. Rule formalism was 
the idea that the complete body of rules, principles and concepts was 
coherent, internally consistent, comprehensive, and gapless, and that 
judges could reason "mechanistically" from this body of common law 
to discover the right answer in any particular case. 
The Realists attacked both notions. Felix Cohen called conceptual 
formalism "transcendental nonsense"-the "theological jurisprudence 
of concepts."44 The Realists argued that the content of concepts was not 
somehow indelibly predetermined but was a matter to be filled in. 
There were conflicts and gaps among the rules, there were exceptions to 
every rule, and principles could lead to more than one outcome in a 
given context of application.45 Moreover, a great deal of flexibility was 
present when determining what particular binding rule of law issued 
from a given case. Rather than starting from the rules and principles 
and reasoning toward the decision, the Realists suggested that the 
judges began instead with a rough sense of the decision and worked 
backward to find supportive legal rules and principles,46 revising the 
decision if necessary in the course of coming to an acceptable 
conclusion.47 
42. Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223 (1931). 
43. Myres S. McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 
YALE L.J. 827, 834-35 (1941). 
44. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935). 
45. See Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 
431, 443 (1930). 
46. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 125-26 (Anchor Books 1963) 
( 1930) (quoting cognitive psychologist Jean Piaget). 
47. See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17, 23 (1924); 
Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial 
Decision, 14 CORNELLL. Q. 274, 285 (1929). 
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V. INSTRUMENTAL VIEW OF LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND LEGAL 
PRACTICE 
Over time the instrumental view of law came to dominate. Legal 
historian Calvin Woodward wrote in 1968 that "At least in the better 
law schools . . . 'realists' are no longer lonely aliens in a hostile world. 
In truth ·they probably outweigh in influence, if not in numbers, the 
Langdellians. "48 
... the society-wide trend toward secularization is the culmination of 
a centuries-long development that has transformed the Law from a 
"brooding omnipresence in the sky" into a down-to-earth instrument 
of social reform and, at the same time of social reform and, at the 
same time, translated ... the lawyer from a quasi-priestly figure into a 
social engineer. Legal education . . . has both reflected and 
contributed to this long-term trend.49 
The Dean of Cornell Law School, Roger C. Cramton, wrote in 
1978 that legal instrumentalism had become "the ordinary religion of 
the law school classroom." This "orthodox" wisdom among law 
professors, conveyed daily to their students, was "an instrumental 
approach to law and lawyering," along with "a ske~tical attitude toward 
generalizations, principles, and received wisdom. "5 
Today law tends to be viewed in solely instrumental terms and as 
lacking values of its own, other than a limited agreement on certain 
'process values' thought to be implicit in our democratic way of doing 
things. We agree on methods of resolving our disagreements in the 
public arena, but on little else. Substantive goals come from the 
political process or from private interests in the community. The 
lawyer's task, in an instrumental approach to law, is to facilitate and 
manipulate legal processes to advance the interest of his client. 51 
Cramton thus captured the view of law as an empty vessel, 
matched by a vision of the lawyer whose role was to serve as an 
instrument of the client and who treated legal rules and processes in the 
48. Calvin Woodward, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. 
L. REV. 689, 732 (1968). 
49. Id. at 733. 
50. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 247, 248, 250 (1978). 
51. Id. at 257. 
15
Tamanaha: The Tension Between Legal Instrumentalism And The Rule of Law
Published by SURFACE, 2005
146 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 33:131 
same manipulative way. 
Inevitably, teaching students to view law instrumentally must have 
an impact on the practice of law. Lawyers can satisfy their duty to 
clients while remaining within the spirit of the law, seeing the law as 
binding dictates to be complied with. Another approach, however, is 
one in which lawyers manipulate and stretch law and legal processes to 
their very outer limits, no matter how far away from or contrary to its 
underlying spirit. Both are recognized approaches toward lawyering. 52 
They might sound similar, but pushed to the extreme they are as far 
apart as this: do what the law requires when pursing the client's end, 
versus, do whatever it takes when pursuing the client's end (including 
manipulating or avoiding the law). Many lawyers in practice today take 
an attitude closer to the second than the first. 
The second attitude toward law is ingrained in students in law 
school. Below is a fair characterization of what, since the 1970's, 
became a widely practiced method of teaching law: 
Most important of all, [lawyers] must have the ability to suspend 
judgment, to see both sides of a case that is presented to them, for they 
may be called on to argue either side. The task of the law professor is 
often to chan,ge a student's mind, and then change it back again, until 
the student and the class understand that in many situations that will 
come before them professionally they can with a whole heart devote 
their skills to either side. Then they have to block out much of that 
part of their mind that saw the other side, finding ways to diminish 
and combat what th? once considered the strong points of the 
opponent's argument. 5 
Regularly, professors will ask the same student or different 
students to articulate the best arguments on both sides. Through this 
pedagogical technique, students are taught to ignore the binding quality 
of law. After three years of this, students understandably come to think 
that legal rules are nothing but tools lawyers utilize on behalf of 
whichever side they represent. 
Consistent with the purely instrumental attitude toward legal rules 
52. For explorations of the different models of lawyering, see generally Rob Atkinson, 
A dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REv. 259 (1995); 
Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence 
and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995). 
53. SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MA YER , THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING 
ATTHE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 116 (1994). 
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and processes, lawyers "are expected and even encouraged to exploit 
every loophole in the rules, take advantage of every one of their 
opponents' tactical mistakes or oversights, and stretch every legal or 
factual interpretation to favor their clients."54 Robert Gordon described 
this common orientation: 
Lawyers should not commit crimes or help clients to plan crimes. 
They should obey only such ethical instructions as are clearly 
expressed in rules and ignore vague standards. Finally, they should 
not tell outright lies to judges or fabricate evidence. Otherwise they 
may, and if it will serve their clients' interest must, exploit any gap, 
ambiguity, technicality, or loophole, any not-obviously-and-totally-
implausible interpretation of the law or facts. 55 
It should be emphasized that the claim here is not that all lawyers 
take such an unrestrained instrumental attitude toward legal rules all the 
time, but many lawyers do much of the time. 
This characterization is not limited to private lawyers. The U.S. 
Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel's infamous "torture 
memo"-which presented a legal analysis of the limits on interrogation 
of prisoners imposed by legal prohibitions against torture-· is a supreme 
example of lawyers exploiting "any gap, ambiguity, technicality, or 
loophole, any non-obviously-and-totally-implausible interpretation of 
the law or facts" in order to allow the greatest possible leeway for the 
U.S. interrogation of prisoners. It was an everyday lawyerly exercise in 
selective reading of the applicable body of legal rules that led to the 
desired result of identifying an extraordinarily high threshold for 
torture: "the level that would ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently 
serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or 
serious impairment of body functions-in order to constitute torture. "56 
A great deal of pain and suffering can be inflicted before engaging in 
torture, by that legal interpretation, which is precisely what the Bush 
Administration wanted. 
The lawyers got there in a transparently simple move. The U.S. 
statute that prohibited torture described it as "severe" pain and 
54. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1988). 
55. Id. at 20. 
56. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, White House Counsel to the President 6 (Aug. 1, 2002), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv /nation/ documents/ doj interrogationmemo20020801. 
pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
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suffering, without defining what was "severe." Office of Legal Counsel 
lawyers searched for the most stringent definition of "severe pain" they 
could find, which happened to come in an insurance-related statute that 
mentioned organ failure and death when identifying emergency medical 
conditions. 57 Hence they defined torture as involving injury that rose to 
the level of organ failure and death. The overarching orientation of these 
lawyers was not to figure out what the law was trying to prohibit-
"torture"-but rather was to produce an arguable interpretation of the 
law that would allow them to accomplish what they desired-to allow 
the application of as much pain possible in order to make prisoners talk, 
and to provide legal cover if the torture was discovered. 
When this memo came to light, on the heels of disclosure of torture 
at Abu Ghraib prison, the public outcry was intense. For the purposes 
of this article, what is most revealing was the relatively unruffled 
response of lawyers, summarized by a legal scholar who noted the 
contrast with the public shock: 
Much of the legal profession . . . met the news with a dramatically 
different take. Charles Fried, for example, defended the OLC's work, 
asserting that ' [ t ]here's nothing wrong with exploring any topic to find 
out what the legal requirements are.'. . . Eric Posner and Adrien 
Vermeule characterized the analysis as 'standard lawyerly fare, 
routine stuff.' Those lawyers who did criticize the memoranda 
concerned themselves with the deficiencies of the legal analysis .... 58 
Although the subject of torture was anything but routine, the memo was 
indeed routine stuff in the sense that every lawyer who reads it would 
find the style of argument of instrumentally manipulating the law to 
reach the end desired intimately familiar. It is what lawyers do. 
Legal rules at their core have a binding quality. It is unclear what 
the full consequences will be to a legal system which is populated by 
lawyers who ignore the binding quality of rules to, without restraint 
short of committing a crime, instrumentally manipulate legal rules and 
processes on behalf of their clients. There are indications that the U.S. 
legal profession is headed in this direction. 
57. See Robert Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 
(forthcoming 2006). 
58. Id. (manuscript at 3). 
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VI. INSTRUMENTALISM AND JUDGING 
When legal education teaches students to see and utilize law 
instrumentally, and the practice of law reinforces this attitude and 
approach, it would seem inevitable that a person who has operated in 
this environment for a decade or more before ascending to the position 
of judge will be affected in ways that lead to seeing law in more 
instrumental terms. In the 1970's legal theorists began to observe that 
judges increasingly engaged in instrumental reasoning to satisfy the 
purposes behind the law, or to further social policies or purposes, or to 
achieve social or individual justice.59 In Law and Society in Transition 
(1978), Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick argued that contemporary 
law was in the process of evolving to a higher legal stage of "responsive 
law" in which "there is a renewal of instrumentalism . . . for more 
objective public ends."60 This was an advance, they claimed, over the 
previous formalistic stage of "autonomous law" in which law was seen 
as separate from politics, and decisions were made strictly according to 
legal rules with no attention to consequences. In this new higher stage 
"the logic of legal judgment becomes closely congruent with the logic 
of moral and practical judgment. "61 
With this spread of instrumental reasoning in judicial decisions, in 
everyday cases as well as in constitutional cases, judges were 
increasingly required to straddle two contrary thrusts: judges are asked 
to apply rules and to reason instrumentally to achieve policies and 
purposes, and just outcomes. Roberto Unger articulated the stark 
difference between these approaches: 
One way is to establish rules to govern general categories of acts and 
persons, and then to decide particular disputes among persons on the 
basis of the established rules. This is legal justice. The other way is 
to determine goals and then, quite independently of rules, to decide 
particular cases by a judgment of what decision is most likely to 
contribute to the predetermined goals, a judgment of instrumental 
rationality. This is substantive justice.62 
59. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); P.S. 
ATIYAH, FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRAGMATISM: CHANGES IN THE FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS AND THE LAW ( 1978). 
60. PHILLIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD 
RESPONSIVE LAW 15 (1978). 
61. Id. at 89. 
62. UNGER, supra note 59, at 89. 
19
Tamanaha: The Tension Between Legal Instrumentalism And The Rule of Law
Published by SURFACE, 2005
150 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 33: 131 
Modern judges, Nonet, Selznick, and Unger suggested, were asked to 
engage in both modes of analysis, which they oscillated between. 63 
Note that a built in tension exists between strict rule application 
and instrumental reasoning toward ends. Judges are charged with the 
task of applying legal rules, which involves coming to whatever 
conclusion is indicated by the body of rules. Achieving ends (satisfying 
policies, purposes, or individual or social justice), in contrast, is focused 
on coming to a particular outcome, regardless of what the rules require. 
What is a judge to do when the applicable legal rules point toward a 
different end, to an end contrary to the correct policy or purpose or to 
individual or social justice? A system committed to the rule of law 
would nonetheless insist that the judge come to the outcome required by 
the law. This respects the binding quality of rules. A system committed 
to an instrumental view of law, however, would have the judge ignore 
or manipulate the legal rules and come to the designated outcome, 
notwithstanding the dictates of the legal rules. Judges who do this will 
thus disregard the binding quality of legal rules. Moreover, matters are 
even more complicated and variable owing to the fact that every 
situation is unique. When the same policies, purposes, or sense of 
justice are asked to be satisfied under contrasting circumstances, the 
result will be a great variation in the application (or non-application) 
and interpretation of the same body of rules. That is what follows when 
achieving designated ends matter more than consistently applying legal 
rules. For the above reasons, the predictability, certainty, and equality 
of application of law will suffer. The rule of law will suffer. 
This aforementioned infusion of instrumental reasoning relates to 
the achievement of agreed upon social policies, purposes, or notions of 
justice. A different though connected (and sometimes 
indistinguishable) way in which instrumentalism detracts from the rule 
of law in the context of judicial reasoning relates instead to instrumental 
reasoning in connection with the personal values and goals of judges. 
Owing to the influence of the Realists, the belief that judges' decisions 
are based upon ideologically preferred outcomes has grown in strength. 
Behaviorist political scientists have long claimed that judges are 
"politicians in black robes." By the Realist account, this operates as a 
subconscious process on the part of judges, who inevitably perceive the 
law through an ideologically colored lens. But it can also be conscious: 
when necessary, in the same way that a lawyer manipulates legal rules 
instrumentally to serve the interests of clients, legal rules can be twisted 
63. NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 60, at 15; see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW 
IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 195 (1976). 
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by judges to arrive at outcomes they desire. "The 'law' . .. becomes 
mere instruments or barriers that judges must utilize strategically to 
advance their a priori political objectives."64 
Viewing the law through the prism of one's personal beliefs is 
perhaps unavoidable, though to correct for this judges can attempt to 
scrutinize the influence their prejudices and views have on their 
decisions. What is not inevitable is that a judge would cross over from 
abiding by the binding quality of law, sincerely trying to figure out what 
the law requires (however unclear), to instrumentally manipulating the 
legal rules to reach a personally desired end, much as a lawyer does in 
service of a client. This traverses the fundamental divide between 
judges coming to the outcome determined by the law, versus judges 
coming to the outcome they personally prefer. The key factor in 
separating the two is the attitude and commitment of judges to live up to 
their obligation to follow the law. 
The critical question is whether the pervasive spread of 
consummately instrumental views of law within the legal culture will 
have the effect of encouraging more judges more often to cross over 
from the first orientation to the second. Then more of their decisions 
will be based upon what they personally prefer, rather than upon what 
law requires. This would no longer be a system in which the legal rules 
have a binding effect on judges. It would no longer be a system of the 
rule of law, but instead the rule of the individuals who happen to be the 
judges. 
VII. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Two separate arguments have been pressed about how an 
instrumental view of law detracts from the rule of law. The first 
argument, at the systemic level, was that seeing law as an instrument, an 
empty vessel to be filled in and applied to satisfy whatever end is 
desired, is inconsistent with the classical understanding of the rule of 
law that there are limits on the government: that even when exercising 
its power to make law, there were certain things the government could 
not do. The second argument was that lawyers manipulate legal rules 
and process to instrumentally achieve the ends of their clients, and, 
more to the point, that judges have begun to reason more instrumentally 
in their legal decisions to arrive at particular outcomes. Instrumental 
treatment of rules in these respects are detrimental to the binding quality 
64. Cornell W. Clayton, The Supply and Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (Or, 
Why Be So Positive About the Judicialization of Politics?), 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 
83 (2002). 
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of law and contrary to the formal rule of law. 
Constitutional analysis involves an intersection of these two 
arguments. Constitutional provisions-for example, clauses 
enumerating governmental powers, or the bill of rights-specify what 
the government has the power to do and specify what it cannot do. In 
this sense, the U.S. Constitution represents the modem functional 
equivalent of former non-instrumental views of law. Both control and 
set limits on ordinary legislation (although the difference remains that 
the Constitution is an enactment of positive law that can be changed, 
whereas non-instrumental law was, in theory at least, beyond the will of 
the lawmakers). 
Thus the U.S. Constitution is a higher form of law that it imposes 
content-based limitations on the government equivalent to the 
substantive rule of law. Instrumental thinking about law has penetrated 
so deeply and thoroughly, however, that it has come to dominate the 
analysis of substantive constitutional limits, as constitutional scholar 
Steven D. Smith observed: 
In its most visible aspect, constitutional law presents reason in 
instrumentalist or "means-end" terms. Scholars have pointed out that 
most of the doctrinal formulas articulated by the Court, whether under 
the First Amendment or the Fourteenth or the commerce clause, are 
presented in essentially the same monotonously instrumentalist terms. 
So laws are viewed as means to social ends, and a law's 
constitutionality is said to depend on how important the law's ends are 
and how effective and necessary the law is as a means to achieving 
those ends.65 
Even in the context of constitutional limits, therefore, law has been 
largely emptied of any substantive values of its own. 66 
Yet another infusion of instrumental reasoning follows from an 
increasingly common form of constitutional analysis applied by the 
Supreme Court. In a number of important subject matters, the Supreme 
Court renders decisions using a "balancing approach" that weighs the 
various interests at stake. Balancing is nothing like rule application that 
65. Steven D. Smith, The Academy, the Court, and the Culture of Rationalism, in THAT 
EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 105 (Christopher Wolfe, 
ed. 2004) (citing Robert F. Nagel, Rationalism in Constitutional Law, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 
9, 9-12 (1987) (citation omitted). 
66. See ALBERT w. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND 
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000). 
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has traditionally been the task of judges. Balancing involves case-by-
case decisions that invite, or create a great deal of leeway for, 
instrumental reasoning to support the outcomes personally supported by 
the Justices.67 
As this suggests, all of the implications of the second argument, 
about the increased instrumental reasoning of judges, apply full force to 
constitutional analysis. The instrumentalism that has come to be a 
routine part of judicial decision making similarly infects interpretations 
of the Constitution. Thus the problems that plague the formal rule of 
law also plague judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions. 
VIII. POLITICIZATION OF THE LAW 
A powerful logic and momentum are at work here, which can be 
seen when the above trends are taken to an extreme and linked together. 
Owing to the indeterminacy of language and general rules, and to the 
fact that every situation that arises is unique, legal rules and 
constitutional provisions and principles are inevitably susceptible to 
different interpretations. This is especially so in a deeply divided 
society where people see rules, principles and standards in different 
ways. Judges reason more instrumentally in cases because they are 
called upon to do so by a greater tendency toward achieving ends 
(policies, purposes, individual and substantive justice), and, separately, 
because more judges more of the time appear to be willing to disregard 
the binding quality of law to instrumentally manipulate the applicable 
rules to lead to the outcomes they personally desire. The effect of these 
developments is that legal decisions will be increasingly infused with 
political disputes, will increasingly be based upon political judgments, 
and will increasingly be determined according to the political 
predispositions of the judges. As a consequence of judges making what 
appear to be political rather than legal decisions, political fights will 
increasingly break out over who will become judges. Thereafter the 
judiciary will become politicized and sharply divided along political 
lines. 
If all of this were to come to pass, the breakdown of the rule of law 
would not be far behind. Fortunately, the U.S. legal system has not 
traveled as far as this scenario, although the Supreme Court is not far 
from it. Political fights over judicial appointments are now 
commonplace at both state and federal levels, but it cannot yet be said 
67. See Christopher Wolfe, The Rehnquist Court and 'Conservative Judicial Activism,' 
in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 200-01 
(Christopher Wolfe ed., 2004). 
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that the judiciary as a whole is sharply divided along political lines and 
it cannot be said that decisions are more political than legal. Current 
events and attitudes reflect enough of this scenario, however, to suggest 
that it must be taken seriously. 
CONCLUSION 
An instrumental understanding of law does not inevitably 
undermine the rule of law. The most important ingredient for the rule 
of law to function is that lawyers and judges, in particular, must be 
imbued with the belief that at their core legal rules have a binding 
component. If the entire legal culture develops the sense that legal rules 
and processes are merely instruments to be manipulated to further 
whatever ends are desired, the rule of law will be hard pressed to 
survive. 
The broader message of this article is that the continued existence 
of the rule of law is always a contingent matter: societies and cultures 
are constantly changing in unplanned and uncontrolled ways, often with 
unforeseen implications and consequences. The fact that we enjoy the 
benefits of a rule of law system today provides no assurance that it will 
be here tomorrow. 
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